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1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case arises from a buyer's breach of a real estate contract for the sale/purchase of 
residential real estate located in Eagle, Idaho. The sole question raised by the case is whether a 
seller who has accepted non-refundable earnest money from a buyer pursuant to an agreement 
memorialized in a standard form RE-21 REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AND SALE 
AGREEMENT and several subsequent RE-11 ADDENDA still has the option of pursuing other 
remedies to collect its actual damages after it has accepted non-refundable earnest money. 
Paragraph 28 of the RE-21 signed by the parties in this case included the following 
language: "DEFAULT: If BUYER defaults in the performance of this Agreement, SELLER shall 
have the option of: (1) accepting the earnest money as liquidated damages or (2) or pursuing any 
other lawful remedy to which SELLER may be entitled." None of the remaining language in that 
Paragraph (Ex. 2A, p. 5) contemplates or addresses a situation where earnest money is made non-
refundable and paid to the seller without conditions before the designated closing date. Rather, 
the remaining language in Paragraph 28 addresses situations where earnest money is deposited 
with a real estate broker and is still being held by the broker at the time of the buyer's default. 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court found, and held, that by 
accepting the non-refundable earnest money the seller had effectively "pre-elected" the remedy of 
acceptance ofliquidated damages and was barred from recovering its actual, substantially greater, 
damages (R. p. 150-151). It is the plaintiff's position that the clear language of paragraph 28, 
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gave it the option of either accepting the non-refundable earnest money it had received as 
liquidated damages or, giving the buyer full credit for the non-refundable earnest money, 
instituting an action to recover its actual damages. 
B. Course of the Proceedings. 
Plaintiff filed its complaint to recover damages caused by defendant's breach of contract 
in District Court in Ada County on November 6, 2013. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on 
July 28, 2014 and defendant filed his Answer on September 9, 2014. Both parties demanded trial 
by jury. The case was eventually tried without a jury, by stipulation of the parties, on September 
1, 2015. The Court entered its Findings of Pact and Conclusions of Law on September 15, 2015 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 142-153) and its judgment on September 24, 2015. Plaintiff filed its Notice of 
Appeal on October 30, 2015 and the case was assigned Docket #43678. After the matter was 
briefed and scheduled for oral argument, this Court concluded that the judgment entered on 
September 24, 2015 was not an appealable final judgment and entered an ORDER 
CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING APPEAL on August 16, 2016 (R. Vol. 1, p.179). Appellant 
filed a motion with the District Court requesting entry of a judgment amended accordingly. The 
District Court did not "re-enter" its amended final judgment until August 31, 2016 (R. Vol. 1, 
p.171) and the original appeal was dismissed without prejudice on October 6, 2016 (R. Vol. 1, 
p.179). Appellant filed its second Notice of Appeal on October 7, 2016 and, pursuant to this 
Court's November 9, 2016 Order Augmenting Prior Appeal (R. Vol. 1, p.167), this matter is 
before the Court again. 
C. Statement of Facts 
Plaintiff, Todd J. Phillips, is the duly appointed Personal Representative of the Estate of 
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Edward G. Elliott and Trustee of a Trust "A" of the Elliott Family Trust, for which he has acted 
in this matter. On the death of Mr. Elliott on March 5, 2008, ownership of the real property 
(located at 1372 W. Wickshire Ct, Eagle, Idaho) which is at the heart of this case passed from 
Mr. Elliott to Trust "A" of the Elliott Family Testamentary Trust. That transfer was accomplished 
on or about the 10th day of April, 2008 (Tr. Pp. 82-83). Phillips, in his capacity as Personal 
Representative of the estate of Edward G. Elliott and Trustee of the Elliott Family Trusts, needed 
to liquidate the assets of the said Trust in order to distribute Mr. Elliott's estate to his heirs as he 
had directed by his last will and testament and listed the said property for sale with an Ada 
County Realtor in September of 2008 for the price of $915,000.00 (Tr. p. 84-85). The defendant, 
Richard Gomez, contacted the plaintiff in October of2008 through the Trust's Realtor and began 
negotiating for the purchase of the property. Those negotiations resulted in an October 28, 2008 
agreement between Phillips and Gomez for Gomez to purchase the subject property for 
$660,000.00, with the sale to close on December 15, 2009. (Tr. p. 85-87). As consideration for 
the agreement, Gomez agreed to make a $66,000.00 down payment as "earnest money", which 
sum would become non-refundable and be paid to the Trust on satisfaction of an inspection 
contingency. Gomez waived the inspection contingency and the down payment was released to 
the Trust in November of 2008 (Tr. p. 22-23). The purchase agreement, which was made on a 
standard, pre-printed Idaho real estate form RE-21 (Ex.2A) and several RE-11 forms (with 
various addenda and supplemental agreements, also entered into evidence at the trial of this 
matter), provided that the closing on the purchase and sale would not take place until December 
15, 2009 and that the defendant would lease the premises in the interim. (Ex. 2B, 2F). A lease 
agreement (Ex.2G) was executed by the parties and Gomez immediately occupied the premises 
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as a tenant, with Phillips expecting the transaction to close on December 15, 2009 (Tr. p. 86). 
Around December 1, 2009, Gomez advised Phillips through their Realtor that he would not be 
able to get a loan and began trying to negotiate a new agreement. (See Tr. p 86-87). Those 
negotiations resulted in an amendment to the agreement, dated December 2, 2009, by which 
Phillips agreed to carry a $100,000.00 note from Gomez, with closing still set for December 15, 
2009 Ex. 21 and Tr. p 87-89). On December 14, 2009, Gomez advised the Realtor, who in tum 
advised Phillips, that he would not close on the property on December 15, 2009 as previously 
agreed (Tr. p. 102-104). 
After defaulting on the contract, Gomez asked of Phillips that he be allowed to continue 
to live in the subject residence as a "month to month" tenant until Phillips should be able to sell 
the property. Phillips agreed. (Tr. p. 122-123 and Ex. 2G) and Gomez continued to live in the 
residence until May 31, 2010. 
After Gomez defaulted on his agreement to close on December 15, 2009, Phillips had the 
property re-appraised and listed for sale with a different Realtor (Tr. p. 96-98. Ex. 5). The 
property sold to a third party in June of 2009 for $527,500.00, with a net to seller of $503,620.50 
(Tr. p. 97-98. Ex. 10-11). 
2. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the district court err when it found Phillips' acceptance of non-refundable earnest 
money from Gomez constituted an election of remedies which precluded him from pursuing a 
claim against Gomez for the damages the Trust actually suffered because of Gomez's breach? 
B. Plaintiff requests an award of attorney fees and costs incurred in this appeal, pursuant to 
I.C.§ 12-120(3), 12-121 and I.AR. 35(b)(5), I.A.R. 40 and I.AR. 41(a). 
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3. 
STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW 
"When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and legal effect are 
questions oflaw. An unambiguous contract will be given its plain meaning. The purpose of 
interpreting a contract is determine the intent of the contracting parties at the time the contract 
was entered. In determining the intent of the parties this Court must view the contract as a 
whole." Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 185-86, 75 P.3d 743, 746-47 (2003). Bakker 
v. Thunderspring-Wareha,n, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 188-89, i08 P. 3d 332,337 (2005). 
When reviewing a trial court's decision following a bench trial this Court's review is limited to 
determining whether the evidence supports the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact 
support the conclusions of law. This Court will exercise free review of a trial court's conclusions 
of law to determine whether the court correctly understood and stated applicable law and whether 
the trial court's legal conclusions are sustained by the facts found. Clayson v. Zebe, 153 Idaho 
228,232,280 P.3d 731, 735 (2012) (quoting Fox v. Mountain W Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 706-
07, 52 P.3d 848, 851-52 (2002)). 
4. 
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITY 
The plaintiff has been unable to find any case, in Idaho or elsewhere, involving a real 
estate transaction where a seller sued a buyer who had made a payment of non-refundable earnest 
money before defaulting on the underlying contract, thereby causing the seller to sustain damages 
substantially in excess of the earnest money it had received prior to the time buyer defaulted on 
the contract. However, plaintiff believes the language in paragraph 28 of the RE-21 (Ex.2A) 
executed by the parties specifically allowed it to pursue a claim for its actual additional damages 
over and above the amount of the earnest money it received prior to buyer's breach of the 
agreement and failure to close on the transaction. 
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As noted above, the RE-21 REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT 
signed by the parties in this case included the following language: "DEF AULT: If BUYER 
defaults in the performance of this Agreement, SELLER shall have the option of: ( 1) accepting 
the earnest money as liquidated damages or (2) or pursuing any other lawful remedy to which 
SELLER may be entitled". (Ex. 2A, p. 5). The remaining language in that paragraph discusses 
only the procedure to be followed in cases where the earnest money paid by a seller is held in a 
trust account by a real estate broker and the seller elects to accept that earnest money as its 
liquidated damages and makes a demand for its release. There is no language there, or anywhere 
else in the RE-21 agreement, or in the RE-11 addenda executed by the parties, addressing a 
situation, like this one, where earnest money is released by a buyer and dispersed to a seller long 
before a contemplated closing (13 months before, in this case). Nor is there any language 
anywhere in the agreement between the parties suggesting the seller here had conceded or given 
up its right to make an election to accept earnest money as liquidated damages, seek specific 
performance or seek to recover its actual damages. In fact, here Phillips had made it clear from 
the time Gomez defaulted that he did not intend to accept the earnest money he had received as 
liquidated damages and did intend to pursue either the remedy of specific performance or the 
recovery of his actual damages. (See paragraph 4 of plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4), a "Memorandum 
of Understanding Re: Terms of Month to Month Lease", signed by Gomez and Phillips on 
January 29,2010, after Gomez defaulted, which reads, in part: 
"Lessor entered into an agreement to purchase the above referenced premises and was unable to 
close that sale, as contemplated by both the original lease and the Purchase and Sale Agreement 
between the parties and Lessee understands and acknowledges that he has no further rights 
regarding the purchase of these premises, pursuant to the said lease, Purchase and Sale 
Agreement or otherwise, and that Lessor, or Todd J. Phillips, acting as Trustee for Lessor, may 
bring an action for specific performance and/or damages which have resulted or may result, from 
Lessee's failure to have purchased the said premises on the terms he previously agreed to." 
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By this language, included in the memorandum of understanding he signed on January 29, 2010 
(Tr. p. 61-62), so he could continue to occupy the subject residence, Gomez was put on notice 
Phillips did not necessarily intend to accept the earnest money he had received as liquidated 
damages. That notice was soon followed by a letter from Phillips' counsel demanding that 
Gomez close on the property and advising him that if he did not do so, Phillips would proceed to 
sell the house and look to Gomez for any damages the Trust might sustain (Ex, 4, p. 2, paragraph 
3, Tr. p. 61-62). There is nothing in the record that would indicate Phillips ever thought about 
accepting, much less elected or agreed to accept, the non-refundable earnest money the Trust had 
received from Gomez as liquidated damages in lieu of it actual damages. 
Gomez did not close on the property and Phillips had the property re-appraised and listed 
for sale with a different Realtor. (Tr. p. 96-98. Ex. 5). The property sold to a third party in June of 
2009 for $527,500.00, with a net to seller of $503,620.50. (Tr. p. 97-98. Ex. 10-11). Phillips, 
who is a licensed Certified Public Accountant, calculated that as a result of the defendant's 
breach, the Trust on whose behalf he has acted in this matter incurred actual damages of 
approximately $60,000.00 (Tr. p. 110-121. Ex. 15), over and above the earnest money it had 
received and filed his complaint in this matter to recover those damages. 
Although the case is not directly on point, this Court has previously addressed the issue of 
the election of remedies set forth in paragraph 28 of an earlier, but very similar version of the 
RE-21 "Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement" used here. In The Margaret H Wayne Trust 
v. Allan G. Lipsky 123 Idaho 253, 257-58, 846 P.2nd 906, 908-09 (1993), this Court held that the 
presence of a liquidated damage clause in an earnest money agreement does not preclude the 
non-defaulting party from recovering its actual damages suffered when the other party breaches 
an agreement to purchase real estate and, after a lengthy discussion of the reasons why a seller 
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should have the option of pursuing a claim for its actual damages even when it had the option of 
accepting earnest money as liquidated damages, concluded that while it might be possible to 
clearly draft an agreement that would limit a seller's remedy to retaining an earnest money 
deposit as liquidated damages, the language in the standard form real estate contract used in that 
case, which is very much like the language in the RE-21 utilized by the parties in this case, did 
not prevent the seller from recovering its actual damages. The plaintiff submits that even though 
there was no non-refundable earnest money in that case, the same reasoning should apply here. 
The conclusion this Court reached in the Wayne case has been cited with approval in 
several other jurisdictions and has met with particular approval in Washington and Colorado. In 
Noble v. Ogborn, 43 Wn. App. 387, 390-91 (Wash. App. Div. 1, 1986), 717 P.2d 285, 288-89 
(1986), the Washington Court of Appeals cited Wayne as authority for the proposition that 
either/or language of the kind found in the REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AND SALE 
AGREEMENT signed by the parties in this case would allow a seller to elect to sue for actual 
damages rather than accepting earnest money as liquidated damages. It should be noted that this 
case did not involve non-refundable earnest money. 
In a relatively recent recent case, the Colorado Court of Appeals, Division V, has cited 
the Wayne case as authority for its conclusion that a liquidated damages provision in a real estate 
contract does not prevent a party from pursuing alternative remedies. See Ravenstar LLC v. One 
Ski Hill Place LLC, 012816 COCA, 14 CA 2401 (29-36) (2016). Neither this case, nor any of the 




Phillips believes the plain language of Paragraph 28 of the RE-21 REAL ESTATE PURCHASE 
AND SALE AGREEMENT (Ex. 2A. p. 5) makes it clear he had the option of either retaining the 
defendant's non-refundable earnest money as liquidated damages or (emphasis added) pursuing 
any other lawful right or remedy to which seller/plaintiff might have been entitled, including 
either specific performance or recovery of its actual damages. In this case, Phillips elected to 
proceed with an action to recover the Trust's actual damages of approximately $60,000.00 over 
and above the amount of the earnest money Gomez released to Phillips. In calculating those 
damages, Phillips gave Gomez full credit for his earnest money and asked the trial court to award 
the Trust an additional sum of approximately $60,000.00 as and for its actual damages (Tr. p. 
110-121. Ex. 15). 
Phillips believes that as a matter of law, the trial judge incorrectly construed the language 
of paragraph 28 of the RE-21 in ruling that Phillips had "preselected" the Trust's remedy and had 
waived or forfeited its right to recover its actual damages by accepting non-refundable earnest 
money from Gomez and therefor asks this Court to reverse the decision of the district court, hold 
Phillips can recover the Trust's actual damages and remand the case to the trial court for 
determination of the exact amount of the damages P}tillips may recover from Gomez. 
! 
DATED this 4th day of March. 2017. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6th day of March, 2017, I caused true and correct 
copies (2) of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be served upon the following by 
depositing the same in the U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid: 
STEVEN FISHER 
Fisher Law Offices, PLLC 
1859 S. Topaz Way, Ste. 200 
Meridian, Idaho 83642 
DATED this 6h day of March, 2017. 
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